NO IDENTITY.NO BOUNDARIES.NO KILL SWITCH.
Your AI agents are running on borrowed trust.
Fidea is the infrastructure to fix that.
Built for teams using
The agentic
identity crisis
When the first AI agents needed to call an API, engineers did what they always do: grabbed an API key from the environment, or borrowed an OAuth token from the user who triggered the workflow.
That was the original sin of agent security.
CREDENTIAL SPRAWL
One agent, 37 API keys, none expiring for 90 days. It was created for a one-hour task three months ago.
INVISIBLE DELEGATION
Agent A calls Agent B, which calls Agent C, which accesses your payment system. Nobody approved that chain.
NO KILL SWITCH
You revoke the agent's token. But the 12 sub-agents it spawned still have active credentials.
IDC projects the market will reach 1.3 billionenterprise AI agents by 2028.
Today, only
0%have dedicated agent credentials.
Gartner projects that by end of 2026,
0%of enterprise apps will have task-specific agents —
racing toward Zero Standing Privileges.
Meanwhile,
0%of organizations have reported a confirmed or suspected
AI-agent-related security event in the past year.
Sources: IDC Worldwide AI Agents Forecast 2024–2028; Gartner 2026; Industry survey 2025–2026
Why traditional IAM fails
The gap between human identity and machine trust is not a feature request.
| HUMAN USER | AI AGENT | |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Once, at login | Continuous, per-action |
| Session duration | Hours | Milliseconds to weeks |
| Delegation model | Explicit consent | Automatic, chain-based |
| Credential lifecycle | Long-lived, renewable | Should be ephemeral, task-scoped |
| Identity source | Corporate directory | Created programmatically |
| Revocation speed needed | Hours (acceptable) | Milliseconds (critical) |
| Audit granularity | Session-level | Action-level |
| Spawn behavior | Never | Frequently, recursively |
01 — RECURSIVE DELEGATION
Support agent calls a fulfillment agent, which calls a logistics API. Three levels of delegation, all using the original human's OAuth token. The logistics API has no idea an AI is involved.
02 — CREDENTIAL HOARDING
A coding assistant accumulates 43 active OAuth tokens across 12 services over six months. Its service account has more production access than any individual engineer. Nobody can enumerate the tokens.
03 — PHANTOM AGENTS
A test agent spawns sub-agents over the weekend. By Monday, seven autonomous processes are running under a single identity, all with database access, none of them intentional.
The trust layer
Four primitives. One infrastructure. Zero inherited credentials.
01
IDENTITY
Every agent gets a cryptographic identity. Not a borrowed human credential. Not a shared service account. Its own identity, issued at creation, revocable in milliseconds.
02
SCOPING
Credentials are scoped to exactly the task, the API, and the time window required. A token issued for "read order #4521" cannot access order #4522.
03
DELEGATION
When Agent A spawns Agent B, the delegation is explicit, recorded, and scoped. B inherits a subset of A's permissions, never the full set.
04
REVOCATION
Any credential, any agent, any delegation chain — revoked in milliseconds. Not hours. Not "after the token expires." The kill switch works at machine speed.
How they compose
Identity: Agent receives unique ID
Scoping: Token scoped to task + API + time
Rules: Deny by default, allow by policy
Delegation: Agent never sees raw credential
Audit Service observes every step — cryptographic chain
Your agents never see raw credentials.
The credential proxy sits between agents and the APIs they access. When an agent needs to call Stripe, it doesn't receive a Stripe API key. It receives a scoped, ephemeral Fidea token. The proxy translates that token into the real credential at the gateway.
A compromised agent has nothing to steal. No credential to exfiltrate, no key to copy, no secret to leak. The blast radius is bounded by the scope and lifetime of its Fidea token.
Millions of AI agents access production databases, financial APIs, and infrastructure controls every day. They operate at machine speed and delegate authority to sub-agents no human ever approved.
They are using your employees' credentials. When something goes wrong, there is no kill switch that works fast enough. Fidea exists to fix that.
The platform
A suite of purpose-built services for managing the complete lifecycle of agent trust — from identity issuance to credential management to real-time monitoring.
AVAILABLE NOW
Agent Registry
Identity, metadata, lifecycle management, instant kill switch.
Token Issuer
OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, opaque tokens, on-behalf-of delegation, task-scoped.
Credential Proxy
Gateway-mode enforcement. Agents never see raw credentials.
Policy Engine
Embedded rules. Deny by default. Scope-aware. Time-windowed access.
Audit Service
Append-only cryptographic chain. Tamper-evident. Complete delegation trail.
Python SDK + CLI
pip install fidea. Three lines to authenticate. Full API coverage.
COMING NEXT
Agent SOC
Real-time anomaly detection, behavior baselines, threat response for AI agents.
2026
Agent DAST
Automated discovery of permission escalation paths and credential exposure in agent workflows.
2026
Federation
Cross-organization agent trust with verifiable identity and scoped delegation.
Exploring
Zero to authenticated agent
in five minutes.
SDK Reference
Full Python SDK docs. Types, methods, error handling.
View docs →CLI Tool
fidea-cli for local dev and CI/CD integration.
Install CLI →API Reference
OpenAPI 3.1 spec. Every endpoint, every parameter.
Browse API →Architecture Guide
How the components fit together. Sequence diagrams.
Read guide →Example Agents
Six examples from simple to multi-delegation chain.
See examples →GitHub
MIT license. Contribute, fork, or read the source.
View repo →Deep dives
NOW
- Authentication
- Identity
- Credential Proxy
- Audit Chain
NEXT
- Security Operations
- Dynamic Testing
- Behavior Monitoring
- Compliance Reporting
FUTURE
- Federation
- Intent-Based Access
- Cross-Org Trust
- Agent Marketplace Trust
The agent economy is here.
The question is whether access to your most sensitive systems is governed by infrastructure designed for agents — or by patches on systems designed for people who type passwords.